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Post by smartarse on Jan 5, 2006 9:57:01 GMT 10
Well for those you unfortunete enough to have spent much time talking topics/issues with me over the course of 2005, you'll know that i spent most of the year trying to convince people that Pakistan was one of the 2 or 3 key countries to know stuff about (along with China and Iraq). Given that this most recent worlds had topics on Iraq and virtually the exact same topic on Pakistan i set for the practice day, i guess i wasn't alone on that view. Well now my tip is this - in 2006 you can add Russia to the list of the most crucially important countries for debaters to know stuff about. Russia is chairing the G8 this year, and is taking increasingly assertive efforts to exert influence in its region, and to re-assert the power of Putin domestically. Here are five articles which if read in order, will give you a sense of why Russia is so important www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/08/opinion/edgvosdev.php (broadly in defence of Russia's stand on NGO's) www.iht.com/articles/2005/12/23/opinion/edrussia.phpwww.time.com/time/europe/magazine/article/0,13005,901060109-1145201,00.html www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1145192,00.html www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/04/opinion/edgas.phpSo my advice would be this, if you've got some free time over the next few days and you want to do something that will help improve your debating, you should sit down and read those articles (and do whatever additional research you need to make sense of it all) and then write a matter file on Russia with some brief pro/con notes on Russia's economy, political situation, regional interests and international role (G8, UN, etc) My hunch about Pakistan was right (i wont pretend my comments about Iraq were insightful) and now my tip is that Russia is gonna be big this year - or should be if topic selectors actually care about choosing issues that are current and important. |
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Post by smartarse on Jan 23, 2006 11:15:52 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on Feb 13, 2006 9:50:39 GMT 10
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Post by phonah on Feb 14, 2006 19:03:46 GMT 10
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4708256.stm- about where Russia will go from here/change in power direction. In spite of Saudi Arabia's unsuccessful attempt at energy dominance, I don't think it's unreasonable to suggest that Russia given time, would become less 'cooperative' with the West, be it through whichever way, ie: energy, UNSC, trade etc. Just a few thoughts, Russia is something that I personally like so I get a kick out of reading about her more than most should.
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Post by smartarse on Apr 17, 2006 12:33:33 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on May 22, 2006 17:45:46 GMT 10
This is the cover story from this week's Guardian Weekly, and the analysis in this article is exactly why i think Russia is such a key country and why there MUST be a big finals debate or bubble round topic about Russia in the near future. guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1776964,00.html |
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Post by TS on Jun 2, 2006 12:28:10 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on Jun 15, 2006 11:46:46 GMT 10
This is a very interesting story about the problems of doing business in Putin's Russia www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/13/news/russia.phpThis is my favourite bit: Russian law allows confiscated material in criminal investigations to be sold or destroyed before the case is completed, let alone tried in court... |
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Post by smartarse on Jun 22, 2006 17:25:35 GMT 10
Here's some hardcore analysis of energy politics in Russia, curtesy of the always excellent Janes. Sorry its long, but its very interesting!
Does Gazprom's tail wag Russia's dog?, Janes Foreign Affairs, 22-May-2006
As the leaders of the G8 industrialised nations prepare to meet in St Petersburg in July, European anxiety is mounting over the continent's energy dependence on Russia.
When Western leaders sit down with President Vladimir Putin, they will have reason to wonder whether Russia could use its clout as an energy supplier as a cudgel.
But they should also realise that Russia's dependence on revenues from oil and gas makes the country's energy sector less an instrument of foreign policy than a crucial factor in determining which policies Russia pursues and how.
In Russia, energy and foreign policy come together in Gazprom, the state-controlled behemoth that has a monopoly on exports of Russian natural gas. Gazprom claims that it produces 90 per cent of Russian gas, is responsible for eight per cent of Russia's GDP, and provides 20 per cent of earnings to the country's federal budget. It is estimated to have accounted for about 28 per cent of gas supplies to Europe in 2005.
Banding together
Gazprom boasts political connections to match. Dmitrii Medvedev, chairman of Gazprom's board of directors, was President Vladimir Putin's chief of staff until November 2005, when he was named first deputy prime minister (while retaining his post at Gazprom). In the wake of Medvedev's promotion, the Moscow rumour mill churned with speculation that Putin himself might head Gazprom when his presidential term expires in 2008. Putin has downplayed speculation that he might take the helm of Gazprom, but his rapt attention to the company is more than apparent. Production has flat lined as old fields run dry, yet Gazprom has put off the costly development of new fields.
Meanwhile, it must maintain both domestic shipments at artificially low prices, which subsidise the Russian economy and ensure social stability, and exports, which produce profits and tax revenues for the federal budget. The ensuing bind has raised fears of a coming supply crunch. Gazprom's crucial importance as the ruling elite's cash cow and domestic social pacifier places it in a relationship of mutual dependence with its customers. The money it brings to the Russian economy matters as much to the Kremlin as the gas it ships out means to the Europeans. Also, with production flat and the development of new fields years away, one of the two available sources for propping up Gazprom's sagging gas balance lies beyond Russia's borders.
The race for gas
The gas Moscow needs to maintain Gazprom's gas balance lies in Central Asia, where Gazprom's purchases, mainly from Turkmenistan, are set to rise sharply. Gazprom had planned to buy 7-10 billion cubic metres (bcm) of Turkmen gas in 2006, but a late-breaking agreement pushed the figure to 30 bcm. By 2008-2009, Gazprom would ideally like to push total Central Asian purchases up to nearly 100 bcm a year. With exports to Europe set to top 160 bcm a year in 2008, Gazprom's own production capacity effectively its limits for the near future and growing domestic obligations to meet, a substantial portion of Gazprom's money-making export portfolio could soon depend on the company's ability to purchase ever-larger quantities of Central Asian gas. As a result, Gazprom faces three key tasks: ensuring supplies from Central Asia, securing delivery and forestalling potential competition. In all three areas, Gazprom's needs bring with them significant foreign-policy challenges, and the Kremlin's energetic actions on all three fronts suggest that meeting these challenges is a high priority.
Ensuring supply and securing delivery
An April 2003 agreement with Turkmenistan put in place a 25-year schedule of shipments with Russian purchases substantially rising to some 80 bcm per year in 2008. The agreement is not iron clad, with pricing and volume open to renegotiation and Turkmen production capacity questionable, but Gazprom's intent is clear. Gazprom has also signed a 2003-2012 purchase agreement with Uzbekistan, with shipments of Uzbek gas now set to remain steady at eight bcm per year. Putin has no option but to maintain good relations with Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov and Uzbek President Islam Karimov. When Russia signed its 2003 contract with Turkmenistan, Putin effectively bargained away the rights of more than 100,000 Russian citizens there, agreeing to cancel a dual citizenship agreement that had granted them minimal protections. In Uzbekistan, a key transit country for deliveries of Turkmen gas, Russia has embarked on a two-pronged offensive, offering political support and investment to an internationally isolated regime. Uzbekistan's ageing Central Asia-Center pipeline is now able to transport only about 40 bcm per year, far below its design capacity. Gazprom has earmarked over USD1 billion to upgrade the pipeline's capacity as it prepares to up deliveries from the region, although the timeframe for the modernisation remains unclear.
Meanwhile, a February 2005 agreement with Uzbekistan made Gazprom the operator for all shipments of Turkmen gas through Uzbekistan effective from 1 January 2006. Beginning in 2007, virtually all of the gas transported via the Central Asia-Center pipeline will belong to Gazprom. Gazprom's efforts to secure delivery routes in Central Asia fit in with the company's broader policy of striving for downstream control. The dispute with Ukraine in early 2006 that led to a brief shut-off of Russian gas shipments was a transparent, if unsuccessful, bid to gain an equity stake in Ukraine's transit infrastructure. Many in the West saw the spat with Ukraine as a political move, with Russia using Gazprom as a foreign-policy lever against pro-Western Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. But Russia recently set a deadline for political ally Belarus either to surrender control of gas transit company Beltransgaz or begin paying market prices for gas in 2007, suggesting that Gazprom's desire to control export routes, and not the political orientations of Ukraine and Belarus, is the core concern.
FORECAST
Gazprom's plans and problems may well be a determining factor in many policy decisions Russia makes in coming years. Thanks to Gazprom, Russia is deepening its involvement in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where ageing dictators, looming succession struggles and dead-end domestic policies offer slim guarantees of stability. Thanks to Gazprom, Russia has a vested interest in blocking alternate, independent export routes for Central Asian gas, whether they involve Afghanistan or Iran. And thanks to Gazprom, Russia may lock horns with China for access to for the region's gas.
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Post by smartarse on Jul 13, 2006 12:31:39 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on Aug 1, 2006 13:27:31 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on Aug 2, 2006 13:45:41 GMT 10
There is a very interesting article on Russia in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs (available for free through ejournals). Here's a taste
Part of the reason for Moscow's confidence is Russia's much-improved financial situation and the consolidation of power in the hands of the ruling circle. High energy prices have resulted in a huge surplus in Russia's coffers, which has allowed the Kremlin to build the third-largest currency reserves in the world, set aside over $50 billion in a domestic "stabilization fund," and start repaying its foreign debts ahead of schedule.
With the standard of living in Russia rising, the political opposition marginalized, and government authority recentralized, the Kremlin has grown assertive and occasionally arrogant. The humility of the post-Soviet period has passed: Russians have made it clear that their domestic politics is no one else's business -- Vladislav Surkov, Putin's chief-political-officer-cum-ideologue, often emphasizes that the country is a "sovereign democracy" -- and Russian leaders have begun playing hardball in the world arena.
Trenin, THE END OF THE AFFAIR, July/Aug 2006, p.87
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Post by smartarse on Aug 17, 2006 14:49:15 GMT 10
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Post by smartarse on Aug 18, 2006 11:34:21 GMT 10
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Post by Julian on Aug 19, 2006 2:54:14 GMT 10
My first instinct with that article was to check the date on it to make sure it wasn't April 1. Just extraordinary.
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